"Euroscetticismo e nazionalismo"
Full Professor of History of International Relations in the Department of Social, Political and Cognitive Sciences at the University of Siena, and holder of a Jean Monnet Chair in History of European Integration. Member of the Scientific Committee of the "Fondazione Craxi", the "Annali della Fondazione Ugo La Malfa", and "Nuova Storia contemporanea". His main research interests concern Euroscepticism, anti-Europeanism, and European integration.
Full Professor of History of International Relations and History of European Integration at the University of Bologna. Holder of a Jean Monnet Chair ad personam in History of European Integration; Director of the Centro Studi Interdipartimentale Punto Europa at the University of Bologna. Her main research interests concern the history of European integration, in particular the political history of the CAP and the external relations of the EEC/EU.
Associate Professor of Contemporary History at the University of Bologna, in the Department of Cultural Heritage, Ravenna Campus. Coordinator of the Degree Programme in History, Society and Cultures of the Mediterranean. His main research interests concern Italian and French political history from the post-war period to the 1970s, and the relationship between domestic politics and European integration.
MODERATED BY
Laura Casadio e Andrea Paolinelli, Junior Expert Punto Europa Interdepartmental Centre on European Studies
Origins and Limits of the Concept of "Euroscepticism" – PROF. PASQUINUCCI
The second session of this edition of "Europa sul Sofà" opens with a reflection by Professor Pasquinucci on the genesis and evolution of the concept of "Euroscepticism," a central theme in the debate on European integration. The term "Euroscepticism" was coined in the mid-1980s by a British journalist at The Times to describe Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's critical stance toward the European integration process. The concept was later developed in academic circles by various scholars, who used it to describe critical or hostile positions toward European integration, distinguishing between a "hard" and a "soft" form. "Hard" Euroscepticism represents the most radical form of opposition to European integration, as it challenges the process itself and calls for its dissolution. An emblematic example is Nigel Farage, leader of the UK Independence Party (UKIP), a party that played a central role in the campaign for Brexit. "Soft" Euroscepticism, by contrast, does not question the existence of the European Union but criticizes specific aspects or policies, representing a less radical form of opposition. These categories have become widely used in academic debate, but they have also drawn criticism from historians, who point to the need for greater precision and nuance. Professor Pasquinucci further notes that the term "Euroscepticism" has certain interpretive limitations. First, it tends to be used mainly to analyze critical positions that emerged from the 1980s onward, particularly after the Maastricht Treaty, risking the neglect of the fact that criticism of European integration has much older roots, dating back to the very beginning of the integration process itself. From the outset, political parties, movements, leaders, and intellectuals expressed critical positions toward European integration. Second, the term ends up lumping together, indiscriminately, all forms of criticism, without distinguishing between constructive and destructive critique, thereby flattening the complexity of the phenomenon. In light of these considerations, Professor Pasquinucci argues that the term "Euroscepticism" is not fully satisfactory. He therefore proposes alternatives such as "alter-Europeanism" or "critique of Europe," which better capture the plurality of critical positions and acknowledge the deep historical roots of such attitudes.
Crisis of Integration and the Limits of the Crisis Paradigm – PROF. LASCHI
The discussion continues with a reflection by Professor Laschi on the paradigm of "integration through crises," traditionally used by historiography to interpret the development of the European integration process. According to this paradigm, crises represent moments of difficulty that, paradoxically, act as accelerators of the integration process, fostering new solutions and institutional advances. Professor Laschi acknowledges that this interpretation has had a certain historical validity, but stresses that today it appears reductive and no longer fully adequate to explain the contemporary reality of the European Union. The current phase is characterized by an endemic, complex, and multidimensional crisis, which manifested clearly with the 2007-2008 economic crisis but originates mainly on the political level. This crisis is intertwined with several factors: a general rise in critical positions toward Europe, the growing nationalization of values originally shared at the European level, and a tendency toward the personalization of institutional leadership, particularly within the European Commission. Added to this are structural problems related to the functioning of the Union: the European institutional architecture, in fact, is still largely based on a model conceived in 1957, when the Community consisted of six relatively homogeneous states, and it struggles today to adapt to a Union made up of twenty-seven heterogeneous states. Among the critical issues are also the problem of unanimous decision-making, which slows down and often blocks reforms, and a growing perceived distance between citizens and European institutions, accompanied by nationalist outlooks adopted by some governments.
Euroscepticism and Nationalism: Internal Dynamics within the EU – PROF. MARCHI
Professor Marchi instead focuses on the relationship between Euroscepticism and nationalism, examining the role that Eurosceptic movements and parties play within today's European political system. He observes that most Eurosceptic forces today are not openly anti-European. However, such movements tend to challenge the European Union from within, promoting messages and strategies aimed at scaling back its role — for example, by asserting the supremacy of national law over EU law, or by proposing an alternative vision of Europe that, in practice, hollows out some of its fundamental principles. In this context, a shift can also be observed in the programmatic positions of some parties, which have gradually abandoned the idea of leaving the European Union while maintaining a critical stance toward its institutions. Professor Marchi also points to a crisis of national leadership, particularly affecting the Franco-German axis, historically the driving force of European integration. Both countries are facing internal difficulties: in France, the Macron presidency is marked by problems of legitimacy and strong political polarization; in Germany, the government appears fragile and reliant on a complex coalition. Despite this, the Franco-German engine remains a necessary — though no longer sufficient — element for guiding a Union of twenty-seven member states.
The Future of the EU and Scenarios for Integration – PROF. LASCHI
Looking ahead, Professor Laschi highlights that the European Union currently finds itself in a context of great uncertainty and transformation, characterized by growing geopolitical complexity and the absence of leaders capable of steering significant processes of change. According to her analysis, there is currently a lack of a lively and structured debate at the academic, political, and institutional levels alike, which makes it difficult to predict the evolution of the European project. Among the possible trajectories, the "multi-speed Europe" hypothesis is the most widely discussed and shared, but it presents significant drawbacks: on the one hand, it could indeed allow deeper integration among groups of states; on the other, it risks undermining the principle of solidarity — one of the cornerstone principles of the entire integration process — leading to the formation, within the Union, of a "club of the strongest." Nevertheless, this option currently appears to be one of the few concretely viable paths forward. In this scenario, a decisive role could be played by younger generations, whose political choices and electoral orientations may influence the future direction of European integration. In the absence of a shared vision and a clear political project, the future of the Union therefore remains open and difficult to predict.
The French Case Between Europeanism and Nationalism – PROF. MARCHI
Finally, Professor Marchi offers a reflection on the French case, highlighting France's historical role in the European integration process and the complex relationship between Europeanism and nationalism. Since the aftermath of the Second World War, France has held a central position in the European integration process, alternating between phases of acceleration and slowdown. The French approach can be summed up in the well-known idea of "building Europe without destroying France," which reflects a desire to take part in the European project while preserving national identity and sovereignty. Over time, France has also sought in European integration a tool to offset the gradual decline of its international influence and to manage Germany's rise. This central role, however, has developed unevenly, with moments of strong momentum and others of stagnation, as in the case of the "empty chair" crisis under the De Gaulle presidency, or the referendum on the European Constitutional Treaty. Since 2005, France's role in the integration process appears to have weakened, to the point of positioning the country as something of a "sick man of Europe," marked by strong internal political polarization, the rise of anti-system parties, economic difficulties, and leadership perceived as fragile.
The Concept of the "European Constraint" and Its Evolution – PROF. PASQUINUCCI
Professor Pasquinucci finally addresses the theme of the so-called "European constraint," with particular reference to the countries that joined the European Union between 2004 and 2007, which have progressively shown a cooling of their enthusiasm toward European integration. Membership in the Union inevitably entails a limitation of national sovereignty, but the meaning attributed to this constraint varies over time and across different political contexts. Originally, especially in countries like Italy, the European constraint was perceived positively, as a useful tool for encouraging domestic reforms and aligning with European standards. Over time, however, the concept of the European constraint has been progressively reinterpreted and used by Eurosceptic movements and figures as a symbol of external imposition, helping to reinforce a narrative of the European Union as a distant and coercive entity.
Conclusion of the Session
The discussion concludes with a reference to the historical protagonists of twentieth-century Euroscepticism, such as Charles De Gaulle and Margaret Thatcher, highlighting the differences with contemporary forms of Euroscepticism. In particular, while De Gaulle can be described as more "Franco-centric" than Eurosceptic in the strict sense, and Thatcher displayed a pragmatic and instrumental attitude toward Europe, today's forms of Euroscepticism appear more widespread and complex, situated within a broader crisis of the international liberal order.
In this sense, Euroscepticism does not represent so much a quantitative phenomenon as a varied and multifaceted set of attitudes and critical positions toward the European project.
Edited by Federica Buttau and Maria Antonietta Paola Aricò