«1. What is the role of material culture in religion, historically, and prehistorically? What kind of phenomenon is religion? Is it a constant or has it changed – has it perhaps become more or less material, discursive, or intellectual with time? Is it basically ideas and beliefs taking place in the mind? Or is it basically a specific discourse, taking place verbally and in writing? Or – further – is it basically, or additionally, a material expression, supplied with discursive explanations? Is material culture basically an illustration of ideas, or does material culture also constitute these ideas? 2. What types of material culture characterize religions as such? What kind of architecture, burials, depositions, gear, statuary, and imagery, characterize the historical contexts, which we agree to be ‘religious’? If we have these material features in the prehistoric record, then do we also have religion? 3. Is it possible to identify religion (historical as well as prehistoric) on the basis of material culture alone? As it is today, definitions of religions are made on the basis of the study of texts and/or observation. When applied to prehistoric material these models run the risk of either not being able to say anything new about the material or of being anachronistic. From what point and place in (pre-)history can we speak about religion?»
(Lisbeth BREDHOLT CHRISTENSEN and Jesper TAE JENSEN, éds., Religion and Material Culture: Studying Religion and Religious Elements on the Basis of Objects, Architecture and Space. Proceedings of an International Conference held at the Centre for Bible and Cultural Memory (BiCuM), University of Copenhagen and the National Museum of Denmark, Copenhagen, May 6-8, 2011, Turnhout, Brepols Publishers, 2017 [excerpt from Introduction: Working Questions])
«Most cognitive studies of religion adopt a modular theory of cognition. The 'space' that is studied is often the 'space between the ears'. Culture and religion are viewed as by-products of more entrenched features of our brains. Although this 'Standard Model' explains many intuitive expressions of religious belief, it has trouble explaining (a) the variability of religious systems crossculturally (b) the uses of material culture (i.e. symbolic structures etc) in transmitting religious concepts. The following thesis presents a 'wideware mind' hypothesis for religious cognition. I urge that while our internal cognitive architecture is causally relevant to religious cognition, the material artefacts of culture must be viewed as cognitive properties in their own right. Hence any causal account of religious cognition must acknowledge the external features of minds and how our neurological resources interact with the artifacts of our world.»
(David J. MURPHY, Sacred Technologies: The Evolution of Religious Cognitive Niche, MA Thesis in Religious Studies, School of Art History, Classical and Religious Studies, Victoria University of Wellington - Collection: Open Access Victoria University of Wellington, 2009. https://figshare.com/articles/thesis/Sacred_Technologies_the_Evolution_of_Religious_Cognitive_Niche/16967245)
«The need for the ethnographic method in the analysis of religious meaning emerges from the specific nature of that meaning. In popular religion, meaning does not originate in a set of propositions, a ‘theology’, but in a form of engagement with the world. This engagement might include different forms of communication whose performative component trumps their propositional contents. These forms of communication are normally defined as ‘symbolic languages’ when religious scholars try to translate them into explicit verbal statements, that is, into a set of propositions. Of all these modes of communication or symbolic languages, in this article I have focused my attention on sacred objects. These are objects with absent signifieds that evoke notions about the sacred, the divine or the supernatural. One way of approaching the analysis of sacred objects is by means of the extended mind hypothesis. What if such objects were instruments of thought rather than objects of thought? That would explain their pre-reflective or un-thematized nature. However, that would leave the culturally specific value that these objects have for their users unaccounted for, since sacred objects are simultaneously instruments of thought and objects of thought. That is what makes them ‘symbolic’: as we think about them, they take us to another form of reality. And yet there is nothing mysterious in these symbolic languages, just as there is nothing mysterious or ‘unnatural’ in the supernatural itself, as long as we do not translate them into propositional language. Sacred objects are uncanny, baffling and enigmatic because we cannot find a theory that accounts for their sacred nature. But we cannot find that theory because there is no such theory other than the object itself and the set of interwoven modes of experience that place it into a meaningful totality.»
(Carles SALAZAR, Understanding sacred objects: Towards an anthropological theory of religious meaning, «Journal of the Anthropological Society of Oxford Online», 2019, vol. 11, núm. 1, p. 53-68)