Pietro Paolo Stohlman
This project explores the evolution of inflation narratives crafted by central banks from 1970 to today, focusing on how varying degrees of Central Bank Independence (CBI) and embeddedness shape these narratives. It examines four central banks—the European Central Bank, Bank of Canada, Bank of Japan, and Bank of Italy—during key inflationary episodes, considering how transnational externalities impact their communication in light of their institutional structure. The study situates these inflation narratives within broader state and institutional transformation processes, particularly how global economic integration and the diffusion of CBI reshape state sovereignty and the role of central banks in national governance. Theoretically, the research draws on the frameworks of “Varieties of ignorance” and “Reputation management” to analyze how central banks frame their inflation policies in times of uncertainty. These frameworks highlight the transnational pressures central banks face to maintain credibility, manage knowledge limitations, and align with global monetary standards while navigatingdomestic political and social constraints. Methodologically, the project combines topic-modelling and word embedding to identify patterns in central bank communication with qualitative process tracing to explore the shifts in narrative framing across different national contexts. The study hypothesizes that more independent central banks, particularly those embedded in global financial systems, will intensify efforts to justify interest rate hikes and obscure uncertainties. The expected findings will underscore the transnational convergence of central banking, showing how central banks contribute to the transformation of the state by pushing the limits of democratic economic governance and accountability through the use of inflation narratives. This project adds to debates on central bank legitimacy and the evolving relationship between states, global markets, and citizens.