

**Who Pays for Africa's Next War?  
EU, AU, and US Strategies in the Sahel**

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I would like to thank Mario Zamponi and Arrigo Pallotti for the invitation to join this seminar.<sup>1</sup> I would like to present my impressions of the unfolding process leading to military intervention in northern Mali. I have decided to phrase the title of this presentation as a question for a number of reasons. First of all, when I began this research it was less clear who indeed would pay for this proposed military intervention. Secondly, I wanted to also ask the question as a larger one, that is when we look at the trends of military operations in Africa today and over the past decade, is it possible to reassess the ‘costs’ of such conflicts beyond the money spent by the EU, the US, and the UN in support of African Union and regional military organizations such as ECOWAS.

Recent news that Niger has secured US \$4.8 Billion for security and development was reported on Thursday, November 15, according to Alex Thurston’s Sahel Blog. The government of Niger had hoped to raise \$2.5 billion for a 5-year “Strategy for Development and Security.” Donors to the new fund include South Africa, Germany, Brazil, Canada, France, the United States, Italy, Japan, Turkey, and the Arab League. This large amount of funding shows how important the security of the Sahelian states has become after the unfolding of the crisis in Mali. To put the size of this pledge into perspective, it is worth noting that the two largest military spenders in the regions are Algeria’s (US\$8.6 billion in 2011), and Nigeria (US\$2.23 billion in 2012) (Simon, L., A. Mattelear and A. Hadfield. 2012, 12-13). These pledges, if actually delivered, would also likely place the costs of Pan-Sahel security beyond the amounts spent on the NATO operations in Libya, which cost the United States and estimated \$1 billion, while the United Kingdom, “spent between 160 million and 300 million pounds (\$257 million to \$482 million)”, and France, “spent between 300 million to 350 million euros (\$415 million to \$485 million) over its budget for overseas military operations.” (Rettig, 2011)

It is interesting to think of this spending in terms of the decision made by NATO members to NOT support ‘boots on the ground’ last year, when “EU Military Staff” predicted it would have required between 30,000 to 120,000 troops deployed post-Qadhafi Libya. (Mattelaer and Marijnen, 2012, 16) EU member states were not at all interested in increasing the expense of the Libyan operation, and certainly not in terms of deploying European troops in Libya. The NATO operation was declared a victory at very minimal costs. Of course, one year later, the Sahelian States in the region, particularly Mali, have now paid the price of the unfinished work of the Libyan operation. And now we see that the EU and the US, along with others, are willing to invest in the security of the region,

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<sup>1</sup> This paper was presented at the international seminar “Sub-Saharan Africa - EU relations: international security and the fight against poverty”, held on 20 November 2012 in the Department of Political and Social Sciences and organized by the Centre of Historical and African Studies on Africa and the Middle East.

starting with Niger.

What about Mali? Who will pay for the intervention there? It appears that given the French-sponsored UN Security Council Resolution 2056 passed on July 5, 2012, it will be the United Nations who will take up the cost of and ECOWAS military operation in Northern Mali. How much will this Operation cost? No one knows at this point but initial requests coming of the recent ECOWAS meeting were given at US\$500 million for the first six months alone. The US and EU are also promising additional training missions for the Malian army, and these pledges are in the range of US\$200 million from the US, and Euro 200 million projected in the European Union External Action Service's new Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel ("Euro 650 million (approximately Euro 450 million in the three Sahel countries and at the West Africa regional level and approximately Euro 200 million in the Maghreb countries." (EUEAS 2012, 8). Given that there is not a legitimate Malian government to support, it is understandable for the moment that Niger will receive the lion's share of immediate pledges for a combined security and development project. The Humanitarian efforts in Mali must also be considered, with hundreds of thousands of refugees and IDPs needing food, and large food deficits for those remaining in the north. The United Nations reported in October an estimated 400,000 displaced people in Mali, with roughly 200,000 IDP and 200,000 refugees in neighboring countries. In October this year, an estimated 4.6 million people were at "risk of food insecurity due to the food and nutrition crises and conflict in northern Mali" (UN OCHA 2012).

The current instability in Mauritania also calls into question how the EU and US will support the Mauritanian government, but given the history of US support for Mauritania and Niger in counter-terrorism training, Mauritania will likely receive additional appropriations of military and development aid in the near future.

Alexander Mattelaer and Esther Marijnen, from the Institute for European Studies at the Vrije University, Brussels, have written an excellent paper for a conference happening this week in Zurich on "International Peacekeeping in Africa". The paper, entitled, "EU Peacekeeping in Africa: Towards an indirect Approach" analyzes how the EU has come to the point where "no boots on the ground" really does mean "no boots on the ground", not so much because of any new sensitivity to charges of neo-colonialism on the part of European nations, France in particular, but because of the institutional shift away from military interventions and towards "capacity building" of African police and military forces. As NATO and EU forces face a similar development in Afghanistan - something we can discuss today to in terms of the relative success or failure of such a strategy - the

attitude toward interventionism has shifted in Africa as well toward what Matteleaer and Marijnen call the “an indirect approach.” They argue that the lack of domestic support for committing European troops to new wars and the financial constraints on European military spending, make it far more likely that Europe will not get involved in any conflict in Mali in terms of troop commitments. The pledge of a EU-sponsored training mission to Mali therefore confirms their thesis. (Hale 2012) As Dominik Jankowski predicted in January of this year, the EU commitments to Sahelian Security will also help “to stave off the creeping erosion of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP).” (Jankowski 2012)

Another development that would seem to confirm the commitment to not involve European troops in Mali, at least in the beginning of the operation, has been the political transition from Sarkozy to Hollande in France. Recently, the French Defense Minister, Jean-Yves Le Drian, assured the media that there would not only be ‘no boots on the ground’, but also no French ‘planes in the air.’ Le Drian reportedly told the European American Press Club, “As for air support, neither Europe nor France will intervene militarily,’ .... ‘When we say no troops on the ground, that means ‘troops in the air’ too ... But bringing in information, intelligence is another thing.” (Keaton, 2012). Le Drain did, however, suggest that France would be transferring drones from Afghanistan to Mali in order to assist in terms of “intelligence gathering” (Keaton, 2012). Given that the ECOWAS military leaders are requesting air support from the international community, it will likely be American air support, and most likely this will come from Predator drones.<sup>2</sup>

So, while the response from Europe has been impressive thus far, there are a few interesting observations that can be made:

1. According to the predictions of Alexander Matteleaer in particular, economic conditions in Europe will likely translate into a firm commitment to avoid the use of European troops, which is a major break from past French engagements in its former colonies.<sup>3</sup>
2. The EU is committed to being in the front of efforts to train the Malian army, and this will likely help reduce tensions had this been only done by France alone, or along with the

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<sup>2</sup> As of March 3, 2013, the US has announced the deployment of Predator drones in neighboring Niger (*New York Times*, “New Drone Base in Niger Builds U.S. Presence in Africa,” February 22, 2013 , <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/23/world/africa/in-niger-us-troops-set-up-drone-base.html>) The Wall Street Journal reports that “U.S. Reaper drones have provided intelligence and targeting information that have led to nearly 60 French airstrikes” in Mali “U.S. Boosts War Role in Africa” *Wall Street Journal* Sunday March 3, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324539404578338590169579504.html#>

<sup>3</sup> NOTE March 4, 2013: Although subsequent events in January 2013 proved this position was incorrect, and in part because the French decided the security situation in January had changed dramatically to warrant intervention, an argument can be made that the French intervention is not designed to be a long lasting mission, and that it has succeeded in forcing the United Nations to commit resources to turning the African forces in Mali into a UN Mission, something the French were pushing for since the summer 2012.

United States. However, commitments to avoid using troops or air support may result in the deployment of American special operations forces in Northern Mali, along with air support.<sup>4</sup>

What are the costs of this EU strategy?

While this “indirect approach” to engagement in Mali makes sense in terms of EU member States’ appeal to their domestic constituencies to support military intervention in Mali—in terms of financial support for military training, intelligence gathering, and humanitarian aid—it may not be as obvious how the US government is building domestic support for intervention. It is already clear that the United Kingdom and Germany have given their support to France’s lead on this issue, and Germany’s foreign minister has been very proactive, visiting Mali personally to offer humanitarian support. The notion that Mali is in Europe’s ‘near neighborhood’ and that the loss of control of Northern Mali, with its airports under the control of AQIM and other Islamist groups, clearly indicates a threat to Europe.

This potential threat has also become part of the discourse in the American press. The New York Times narrative of events in Mali is instructive for how this “war on terror” trope is associated with the Malian crisis in the United States. Reporting on Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton’s visit to Algiers to meet with the Algerian president, the New York Times provided the following background information on

“The Islamist gains in Mali stem from a number of factors. The fall of Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi in Libya prompted ethnic Tuareg rebels from Mali, who had been fighting alongside Colonel Qaddafi’s forces, to return to northern Mali with weapons from Libyan arsenals. They joined with Qaeda-affiliated Islamist militants who had moved to the lightly policed region from Algeria, and the two groups easily drove out the weakened Malian army in late March and early April. Then the Islamists turned on the Tuaregs, chasing them off and consolidating control in the region in May and June” (Gordon, NYT, October 30, 2012, p 4).

This simplified and digestible account does not articulate the ways different groups in the north, the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Ansar Dine, (Ankar Eddine), and the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), interact and overlap with each other, nor does it explain Malian and neighboring military and economic interests, nor does it explain how diplomacy and the threat of intervention is

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<sup>4</sup> NOTE March 4, 2013: American military aid did come in the form of C-17 transport planes that were responsible for transporting the French troops to Mali from Southern France.

currently shaping the conflict.

Roland Marchal's perceptive description of entangled alliances, along with Wolfram Lacher's argument about the predominance of drug trafficking and kidnapping as the key source of revenue for rebel groups, when taken together, complicates the main narrative that would like to see the Malian crisis as something confined within national borders, a broken state that only requires the help of better equipped African soldiers to mend the broken state and chase away AQIM and other 'bad guys'. This Hollywood version of interventionism is a dangerous one, just as the much bigger budgeted US and NATO operations in Libya were scripted to have a beginning and an end without much concern for any more complicated sequels. My basic premise about causation is that the EU and US counter-terrorism strategies already in place in Mali were problematic given the political economy of the North, the collusion of government officials with drug smuggling and kidnapping (UNODC 2007; Lacher, 2012), and the lack of credibility of the central state. The weakness of the former ATT government seems to be the main factor, as Niger also received similar EU and US counter-terrorism funding and received more Tuareg ex-soldiers returning from Libya without a similar breakdown as in Mali. Marcel asks an interesting question about existing EU and US efforts at counter-terrorism, one that many of us asked once news of the breakdown in military discipline became known during the March 2012 coup. If the EU and US efforts at security sector reform and counter-terrorism training were proceeding well, why wasn't there more intelligence about the lack of Government support for Malian soldiers? Why had such US military training not helped to avoid the crumbling of the Malian army when they were confronted with well-armed Tuareg soldiers in March 2012 upon their return from Libya?

It also appears that the Mali situation, while sparked by the lack of contingency planning by NATO concerning the impact the Libya operation would have on the region, now seems to be confronted in a diplomatic fashion very similar to what happened before air attacks began in Libya. Once again it is reportedly the French who have lobbied the hardest to seek UN Security Council support for a military intervention. The African Union has been brought in to commit and plan the intervention, although it will be the ECOWAS military forces that are now likely to lead the fighting with a proposed force of some 3,500 soldiers, mostly from Nigeria. Unlike Libya, however, the task is not to support rebel groups in toppling a dictator that had only recently been an ally of many NATO states, including the US, but in this case help fight rebel groups seeking autonomy in Northern Mali. In this case, the situation on the ground is perhaps more analogous to Somalia in the mid 2000s, when the Western powers-particularly the US under the George W. Bush administration-refused to recognize the Union of Islamic Courts-and gave a green light to Ethiopia's invasion of Somalia. The

following years led to a consolidation of power by al-Shabab in southern Somalia, not so much because of their ideology but because they were the only power in Somalia willing to stand up to Ethiopia and they offered an outlet for young men to accumulate some capital. Now, after many years of AU fighting using Burundian and Ugandan forces, and billions of dollars of UN, EU, and American support, AMISOM has succeeded in forcing al-Shabab out of the major cities and there is a sense of the tide turning in favor of the Transitional Government of Somalia. Because of the timing of the successes of the AU operations in Somalia, many think that the proposed Malian intervention should take a similar shape.

The decision to financially support an AU mission in Somalia has been very costly, both for the African soldiers who have lost their lives fighting for the re-establishment of State control in Somalia, and in terms of funding. There were many issues of insufficient funding and troop commitment in the early years of AMISOM, and now, with the contributions of Kenya's national army along with thousands of Ugandan and Burundian troops, the war has turned in favor of the national government recently elected in Somalia. It would seem, therefore, to offer a model of success for the "indirect approach" to intervention currently championed within the EU and elsewhere. There are important issues, however. One being the way nations who contribute troops are able to use this as a form of accumulation for their own militaries and often for corruption back home. The AU's role in previous interventions have not been particularly impressive, and participation in AU, UN, or regional interventions (such as ECOWAS), have helped nations such as Nigeria and Ghana maintain their military and serve as a form of recruitment given the higher pay and the chances for accumulation these missions provide participants at all ranks and levels. (Ayangafac & Cilliers 2011; Aning 2007) More recently, Museveni in Uganda has threatened to withdrawal troops from Somalia in response to criticisms that he has supported the M23 rebel group in the DR Congo. The ability to use participation as a form of political leverage is clear, as is the impunity it gives to leaders who carry out crimes in their own or neighboring countries. The Kenyan contribution to the Somalia intervention will be rewarded by further lack of criticism of the political violence and corruption that continues even after the disaster of the 2007 elections.

In the Sahel, regional state and non-state actors have high stake interests in the drug traffic that passes through Mali, making the decision to spend additional millions of dollars on intervention all the more questionable given the likelihood that weapons and funds will end up assisting these networks and not seriously alter the 'mafia state' alliances that have developed over the past 10 years as the cocaine trade in particular has really increased. (Lacher, 2012) How will ECOWAS forces engage in forms of accumulation offered by access to the criminal networks in the Sahel?



How will the provision of such large amounts of weapons and transport manage to stay out of the shadow economies of the region? These are large questions that need to be considered even as the EU and the US rush to support counter-terrorism in the region and to 'rebuild' the failed state that Mali has become.

Policy makers and military leaders cannot time a crisis, but it is worth considering the extent to which American and European assistance to Mali and neighboring states hindered and at the same time may have helped swing support for the various Tuareg rebel groups after the fall of Qaddafi. (Marchal). Making an opportunity out of the crisis, Simon, Matteleur and Hadfield (2012) argue that this crisis offers the EU and the European External Action Service (EEAS) an opportunity to deliver further on what the EU has already started in what was planned to be a more holistic approach to security, as the EU has focused both on military training and increased food production, and non-military civil-society initiatives. (See Porozzi 2011, Agad-Clerx & Tissi, 2012)

Wolfram Lacher goes further to suggest that training and arming the Malian army is not necessarily the best approach to the issues in the Sahel. Arguing that the return of an estimated 1500 Tuareg soldiers who fought for Qaddafi in Libya has made the situation worse, he, like many other experts on the region do not see these fighters and AQIM as the main source of insecurity. Lacher suggests that

new and potential future conflicts pose a much greater threat to regional stability than AQIM, which in turn is largely a symptom of increasing organised criminal activity in the Sahel. Building the capacity of the security forces does little to tackle these problems, which are political in nature. In Mali, provision of training and equipment to the security forces should be suspended until the conflict is resolved (Lacher 2012)

For Lacher, the support of groups within Mali will be tantamount to taking sides and therefore make the situation worse. He recommends that the EU work with Algeria and the transitional government in Libya to resolve the crisis before beginning to build up security and state structures in ways that can take on the much more serious structural problems of state failure.

One of the most perceptive commentators on the Malian crisis is Roland Marchal, who after debunking the myth of an al-Qaeda threat from the region as the biggest threat, remarks on what an intervention solely focused on AQIM will miss:

There are good enough reasons to fight the armed Islamist or jihadi groups without needing to create fake rationales. The real discussion should be much more serious and strategic. The

rate of urbanisation in this part of Africa is rising dramatically: how will employment be created for the youth who are entering the workforce? Are trafficking and war the only jobs available to them? Why has the international community failed to pressure national governments to increase development in this region? Would a military intervention merely change the profiteers (state officials and local businessmen taking over from AQIM and other jihadi groups) or be used as an opportunity to radically challenge the region's criminal political economy? (Marchal, 2012b: 4)

The International Crisis Group's analysis of the situation is equally cautious about the possible side effects, or unintended consequences of intervention:

It is necessary to restore the political, institutional, security and military foundations of the state in order to gradually regain the three northern regions. Crisis Group maintains that the idea of hastily putting back together military forces in order to quickly regain control of the lost territory must be discarded in the short term. In the past two months, nothing significant has been accomplished with regard to the reconstitution of a coherent chain of command within the army. In the current context, a Malian military offensive supported by ECOWAS or/and other forces is likely to cause more civilian casualties in the north, worsen insecurity as well as economic and social conditions throughout the country, radicalise ethnic communities, encourage violence by extremist groups and drag the whole region into a multidimensional conflict with no front line in the Sahara. (ICG 2012)

In terms of who should lead such an intervention, both Marchal and the ICG have indicated that the situation of intervention would be complicated by the perceived role of France and the US in taking the lead. If the US pushes the counter-terrorism line too hard, could lead to similar mistakes made in Somalia in 2007 with the Ethiopian invasion. Giving local populations reasons to support al-Shabab when their initial support was tenuous. Marchal suggests that the EU should take the lead because they are not perceived in Mali to be overly self-interested:

However, there might be some hope from European Union (EU) engagement. The EU has articulated a policy towards the Sahel that takes into account development, security, local administration and engagement. On paper, this is the best that can be achieved if the new government in Mali shows a willingness to address the root causes of the conflict in its northern region. The EU is also seen as more neutral by Malians and unconnected to military interventions. Yet past history shows that the EU needs to act quickly and decisively and avoid getting bogged down in its own bureaucratic processes. In addition, EU actions must appear to be above some of its member states' interests if the EU is to be a real

political actor in the Malian context and not simply a source of funding, as has been the case in many other crises. (Marchal 2012a, 7)

The possibility remains, however, of France becoming the default leader of the intervention, which may lead to conflicting interests of French support for local and regional allies and the claims that a French-led mission would stay neutral and serve as a ‘peacekeeping mission.’ As Tobias Koepf has shown, peace operations led by France in Cote d’Ivoire and Tchad suffered from this dual mission and dual loyalties (Koepf, 2012). Therefore, the combination of a shift in EU and French policy towards African interventions would seem to indicate that France will not be committed to unilateral military action, but more likely to the sort of efforts of military and police training, and capacity building already proposed for Niger and Mali. There is also the possibility that the threat of force can still lead to a negotiated settlement, although France’s alleged initial support for the MNLA, up to the point where they were unable to fight against AQIM, and now again after they have lowered their expectations from succession to “autonomy” may lead to a negotiated settlement before the intervention becomes extensive (Bax 2012, Marchal 2012b). In addition, Algeria’s ability to negotiate with Ansar al-Din may also still produce results, as might the role of Burkina Faso’s President Blaise Compaoré mediation with Ansar al-Din. Still, as many know, Compaoré’s reputation for making deals that will serve his own interests first make it difficult to see any agreement developing that will satisfy Niger, Nigeria, Mauritania, etc. Perhaps Prime Minister Prodi’s efforts will be able to break through the impasse of negotiations, and there will be progress before the ECOWAS forces are deployed. The overlapping interests of regional and international actors, however, would question the ability of the various actors in Northern Mali to reach a position where they would be satisfied by promises. As in the Sudan, the process begun by the United States with the negotiated Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005 that led to the creation of the South Sudan became a model followed in Darfur by rebel groups, and also now for groups caught in the battle between North and South Sudan. Given this recent trend, it is difficult to envision an easy turn around when there are resources to gain from remaining intransigent.

Gregory Mann, a historian of Mali, had wrote in October that “It has been clear for weeks-if not months-that outside military intervention in Mali was necessary, inevitable and impossible.” (Mann 2012) Mann explains that it is necessary because of the “extremely dangerous” situation faced by “hundreds of thousands of civilians chased from the territory”, and that it is also a very dangerous situation for Mali’s neighbors. Mann believes military intervention is also “inevitable” because “Niger, Nigeria and Mauritania are directly threatened by the jihadists.” Only Algeria can tolerate the situation at present. Mann then explains that the thought of an intervention remains

“impossible” because “Maliens could not agree on it, and no one part of the unstable governing coalition has been strong enough to impose its views on the others.” He suggests that this has changed, however, and now the Malian government is in a position to cooperate with ECOWAS (Mann, 2012).

Lastly, it must be considered somewhat of a fallacy to believe that the dual strategy of diplomacy and preparation for intervention is ‘value neutral’ the case of Mali. I would like to hear more from others here on this, but it would appear that those working most for dialogue and compromise have their own regional agendas (Algeria, Burkina Faso), while those preparing for intervention have different views of what they would like a post-intervention Malian state to look like (France, EU, US, Niger, Nigeria). It is therefore worthwhile to pay close attention to how planning for an intervention proceeds once the UN Security Council has another look at the AU-ECOWAS plan. Will the argument be one of needing to act as quickly as possible to make it more difficult for AQIM and other groups use northern Mali as a staging area for further regional activities? Or will there be an argument in favor of prolonged diplomatic engagement both by UN Special Envoy Prime Minister Prodi and the regional leaders who have already begun negotiations?

This question would seem to get at a larger one raised by this discussion. Whether or not the most likely and promising model for EU intervention is, in fact, the most appropriate one for the Malian and Sahelian crisis? Is it a case of ‘fighting the last war’ (Somalia) with hopes that ECOWAS will be more effective than the Ethiopian invasion was, and with hopes that the opposition in northern Mali turns out to be less of a fighting force than predicted? And, if as some would argue, the Tuareg and jihadist forces who now hold key cities in Northern Mali should “melt into the desert” as they have in the past, what will the role of ECOWAS then be? Will they become an occupying force in terms of a peacekeeping mission? Or will the mission be completed after an initial 6-month period, as currently proposed. The only number I have heard of the cost of the ECOWAS mission is US \$500 million as suggested by the ECOWAS military leaders for the first 6 months. One can imagine that the cost will soon become much larger than this, as the history of funding for previous UN-sponsored ECOWAS or AU missions have shown. Currently the UN appropriated US\$ 5.68 Billion for African peacekeeping mission for 2012-2013. This does not include any appropriations yet for Mali but signs clearly point to a long and costly mission there, with already requests for US \$1 Billion for the first year. Long-time Malian and Sahel expert, Leo Villalón, remains pessimistic over what will likely become a long-term crisis in Mali. The conditions that led to state failure were long in the making, and therefore the solution will unlikely come from any quick and decisive military action on the part of ECOWAS (Villalón 2012). Similarly, the fact that the United

States has already spent upwards of US \$70 million in support of the Malian military in the last few years, and more over the past decade (Mann 2012), would seem go against the idea that more military spending will result in a successful resolution to Mali's problems. The subsequent inability of the Malian army to engage with the Tuareg once the battle for the north began, does not bode well for the ability of donors to quickly turn around the Malian army and turn it into the proposed 5,000 strong frontline force ECOWAS has suggested.

Once again Marchal has put this trend into perspective:

However, critics are pointing to two main shortcomings in U.S. aid to Mali. The first is that such aid is driven by the AQIM threat and not by a more comprehensive political understanding of the situation both in Mali and northern Mali. In the latter region, ambiguities are numerous and should be properly understood and deconstructed, not framed in too conventional a framework. The "war on terror" has played a very ambivalent role in the Islamic debates in Mali, and the current focus on jihadi organisation while the population is assailed with so many other problems (Mali is still one of the poorest countries in Africa) may actually have already become counterproductive.

This situation may indicate that the dismantling of AQIM and Ansar ed-Din would have to fulfill certain conditions to avoid these groups being seen as respectable and suddenly trustworthy by communities in the region. Looking at U.S. policy in other parts of the continent, there is a strong risk that this may become the case if the U.S. does not begin to think beyond its rigid normative security agenda (Marchal, 2012b).

The unfortunate reality is that the presence of AQIM among those who have occupied Northern Mali's main cities has resulted in a call for more concentration of funding on military efforts rather than development and capacity building. The transformation of Francophone Sahelian states into security states linked to American and European interests is the likely outcome. China is also willing to support the Malian military in as part of their continued close ties with the Malian state. (Dembele 2012). We can discuss the implications of these strategies for the region and for Europe. I have not spoke of the resource conflicts that lay below the conflicts over territory, but this is another consideration worth discussing.

## **Appendix 1. Costs of UN Peacekeeping Missions in Africa**

Costs of UN military (peacekeeping) in Africa:

Appropriations for July 1 2012 to 30 June 2013

MINURSO (Western Sahara)	US\$ 61 million
MONUSCO (DRC)	US\$ 1.4 Billion
UNAMID(UN-AU Darfur)	US\$ 1.5 Billion
UNISFA (Abyei Sudan)	US\$ 269 million
UNMIL (Liberia)	US\$ 518 million
UNMISS (South Sudan)	US\$ 876 million
UNOCI (Cote d'Ivoire)	US\$ 600 Million
UNSOA (Somalia)	US\$ 456 Million

Total AFRICA APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2012-2013 US\$ 5.68 Billion

Source: A/C.5/66/17

General Assembly 12 June 2012 66<sup>th</sup> Session fifth committee "Agenda item 146: Financing of the support account for peacekeeping operations and the United Nations Logistics Base at Brindisi, Italy"

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